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1 Introduction
Expectations on fiscal variables are crucial to understand the effect of fiscal policy on
the private sector. Little is however known on the actual way people form expectations
on fiscal variables. While many theoretic models are based on the hypothesis of rational
expectations, empirical evidence is limited and indirect; this is partly due to the unob-
servability of expectations.
The standard approach is to empirically investigate predicted relations between ob-
servable variables, like relationships between fiscal variables and components of output,
and from there to infer the effect which unobservables might have played. Examples of
this approach range from classical tests of the Ricardian equivalence (see Seater, 1993,
for a review), to more recent analyses of the so called ‘anti-Keynesian’ (i.e. expansionary)
effects of fiscal adjustments (Giavazzi, Jappelli, and Pagano, 2000).
A problem in this approach, however, is that the identification of the effects of expecta-
tions is model-dependent, and model comparison is very hard. Moreover many unobserved
correlated factors are typically at play in data collected from real economies. This makes
identification of the effects of expectations quite difficult, because “economists cannot
observe all the data that economic agents do” (Seater, 1993, p. 164).
The latter limitation is also relevant for expectation measures derived from opinion
surveys1. Moreover surveys suffer from lack of economic incentives to reveal true opinions,
so that for various reasons respondents “may express judgements that are different from
the ones they choose to act upon” (Pesaran, 1987, p. 209).
A third approach is to measure expectations in a controlled experiment, as in some
recent literature in monetary economics (Duffy, 1998, gives a survey). While this approach
allows to implement the ceteris paribus condition as none of the other two (and correct for
the lack of incentives of the survey approach), it suffers from the critique that the stimuli
are given in situations that are far from the real economic world, thus questioning the
validity of the connection between the lab and the real economy. This is the well-known
problem of “parallelism” in experimental methodology (Smith, 1982; Plott, 1987).
In this paper, we study the process of forming expectations on fiscal policy, combining
field and lab data to address the problem of parallelism. The approach innovates on
existing literature in various respects. We list here few areas in which the paper gives
original contributions.
First of all, unlike in most experiments, the stimuli are given sequentially, using re-
alized annual time series of fiscal variables from 15 OECD countries. This experimental
conditions are meant to make the experiment as close to reality as possible. Many time
series of realized expectations are thus recorded.
A preliminary look at the data shows that agents’ expectations deviate not only from
perfect foresights, but are also outperformed by a model of purely adaptive expectations.
Understanding the reasons and mechanics of this observation is one of the purposes of the
paper.
Given the type of stimuli-response data of this experiment, there is in particular a need
for new techniques to model both parts of the data. We develop a modeling strategy which
1For example, surveys conducted by Grun (1991) and Allers, de Haan, and de Kam (1998) found
widespread evidence of misinformation on the conduct of government fiscal policy.
2
is consistent both with current practice in macro-econometrics and micro-econometrics.
We assume that the joint Data Generating process (DGP) of stimuli and expectations data
is a VAR; we next show how natural assumptions arising from the experimental design
imply specific restrictions. Two subsystems are derived, one for the field data and one
for the agents’ expectations; we then discuss various possible econometric relationships
between the subsystems. Various econometric results in the area are collected and we
show how to analyse the field data first and subsequently the expectation data. The
analysis allows for non-stationary behaviour both of field and expectation variables.
Many macroeconomic investigations use cointegration techniques and Granger causal-
ity tests to investigate the sustainability of fiscal policy and the type of causality between
taxes and public expenditure2; the present two stage analysis contains this analysis as the
first step.
The present approach encompasses many micro-models for the formation of expecta-
tions in the second step. We find that a major component of the process depends on past
forecast errors. But as a major deviation from a purely adaptive model, we also observe
a tendency of subjects to give greater weight to a degree of short-run causality running
from public expenditure to taxes than what there is in the real world stimulus data.
Agents appear to have a presumption for a model of fiscal policy consistent with the
so called ‘spend and tax hypothesis’, as advocated since the nineteenth century by the
‘Italian School of Public Finance’ (see Buchanan, 1960, and, more recently, by Barro,
1974, 1979, and Peacock and Wiseman, 1979).
A different perspective in which the lab subsystem can be analysed is in terms of
general models of expectation forming. The evidence neither supports the ‘rational ex-
pectation hypothesis’, nor a purely adaptive scheme; rather, expectations fall within a
class of so called ‘augmented-adaptive models’, introduced in the early eighties by various
authors, see Pesaran (1987). These models then become the starting point for a growing
literature of ‘bounded rationality’ (Sargent, 1993) and ‘adaptive learning’ in macroeco-
nomics (see Evans and Honkapohja, 2001, for a comprehensive survey).
The VAR approach we take to analyse the data excludes non-linear behaviour in
the DGP. This may be disputable, since discretionary interventions and exogenous shifts
may introduce non linearities in fiscal policy (as for example documented for the US
by Bohn, 1998, and Sarno, 2001). The latter case is of interest since it may also gen-
erate specific anti-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy (see e.g. the models surveyed in
Giavazzi, Jappelli, and Pagano, 2000, and the empirical investigation conducted therein).
We test for nonlinearity and find that the VAR specification is robust against it.
Conversely, we argue that evidence of agents inclination for a model where govern-
ment expenditure Granger-causes taxes, may indirectly support an interpretation of anti-
Keynesian effects based on the so called ‘composition view’ of fiscal adjustments (see, e.g.,
Alesina and Perotti, 1997, and Alesina, Ardagna, Perotti, and Schiantarelli, 2002).
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the setup of the experiment.
Section 3 shows some preliminary evidence from the experiment. Section 4 develops the
econometric approach to analyse both the stimulus and the expectations data. Section 5
discusses the empirical specification of the field and lab models. Inference results are pre-
2See, e.g., Trehan and Walsh (1991), Hakio and Rush (1991), Ahmed and Rogers (1995), as classical
references; Payne (1998), Garcia and Henin (1999), as more recent examples.
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sented in Section 6. Section 7 relates the results to current research on the anti-Keynesian
effects of fiscal policy. The last section summarises and discusses the implications of the
present approach for experiments in macroeconomics.
2 Experimental setup
The experiment has a time-structure, t = 1, ..., n; the setup nests a simple (two-periods)
representative agent small economy. Participants are exposed to graphical representations
of time series of fiscal variables, taken from various European countries data. The stimuli
refer to taxes Tt, public expenditure Gt, public debt Bt, and change in the debt level
∆Bt = Bt − Bt−1 at time t, all expressed as yearly percentage of GDP. Here and in
the following ∆ is the time difference. In this paper we focus on the relationship and
the direction of perceived causality between taxes and expenditure, namely vector xt :=
(Tt, Gt).
Agents do not know which country and which period the series refer to. Utility in the
experiment is derived from consumption over two subsequent periods:
ut =
t+1∏
i=t
γCi + (1− γ)Gi with γ = 0.75 (1)
subject to the budget constraint
t+1∑
i=t
(1− Ci − Ti)︸ ︷︷ ︸
savings
· (1 + r)i−t = 0 with r = 0.1 . (2)
Agents receive initial information on the first seven values of stimuli; for most
countries the first available year was 1970. Let t − 1 be the last available year and
Xt−1 := (x1, ..., xt−1)
′ the available information; for each subsequent year t agents forecast
taxes and/or public expenditure. Two experimental treatments were performed: in one
of the treatments participants forecast both Tt and Gt; in a second treatment participants
forecast Tt only. Forecasts are indicated as T
Ei
t and G
Ei
t , where i indicates agent i and E
stands for expectation. Let yi,t indicate all the forecast of agent i that refer to time t; in
the Tt and Gt treatment yi,t := (T
Ei
t , G
Ei
t )
′ while yi,t := T
Ei
t in the Tt only treatment.
The interfaces used in the lab for the two treatments are shown in Fig. 1 and 2.
With both interfaces, agents express forecasts clicking with the mouse directly into the
diagrams.
The time series of the stimuli are updated recursively each year after forecasts are
made, so that subjects learn about realization of the stimuli as the economy moves on.
More specifically, given subjects’ forecasts yi,t for year t, the computer determines an
optimal consumption level Ct−1 for the current period given eq. (1) and (2). In period t,
xt := (Tt, Gt)
′ become available and are communicated to the participant. The computer
uses equation (2) to determine Ct and then uses equation (1) to calculate the participant’s
utility for period t− 1. The participant’s per minute wage is
w = 0.66 · (ut/u
∗
t )
η where η =
{
12000 Tt and Gt treatment
15000 Tt only treatment
(3)
4
0 5 10 15
30
40
50
public debt
time
5 10 15
0
10
−10
−20
change of public debt
time
35 40 45 50
35
40
45
50
government expenditure
tax revenue
Values are given as percentage of GDP. Gray lines indicate past, black lines indicate recent years.
Figure 1: Tt and Gt treatment
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Figure 2: Tt only treatment
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Table 1: Summary of the experimental treatments
Country
Sample
period
Participants
Tt and Gt treatment
Participants
Tt only treatment
Austria 1970-98 16 19
Belgium 1970-98 20 22
Denmark 1971-95 15 17
Finland 1970-98 12 15
France 1977-98 12 10
Germany 1970-98 11 14
Greece 1975-98 8 15
Ireland 1970-95 17 22
Italy 1970-98 14 17
Netherlands 1970-98 13 11
Norway 1970-98 15 16
Portugal 1970-98 10 13
Spain 1970-98 14 13
Sweden 1970-98 17 14
UK 1970-95 15 16
where u∗t is the utility the participant would obtain with forecasting the true values. This
transformation from utilities into wages is monotonic and, hence, does not affect the
maximisation problem of the individual. The transformation, however, creates steeper
incentives to make good forecasts.
Participants are payed this wage up to two minutes for each forecast. If a participant
needs more time to complete a forecast only the first two minutes are paid3.
Different agents participated in the two treatments. 27 took part in the Tt and Gt
treatment and 28 in the Tt only treatment. Each agent made predictions for more than
one country within each treatment. Table 1 summarises the parameters of the treatments,
with the number of participants in the various conditions. Stimulus data were from 15
European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and UK4.
For the majority of countries the sample period of stimulus data was 1970-98; few
exceptions (Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland and UK) are due to limits in the availability
of the fiscal time series. For all countries, expectations recording started from the seventh
year of the stimulus (which was then 1977 for most countries). A representation of the
stimulus data for the different countries is shown in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4.
The experiment was run in the experimental laboratory of the SFB 504 in Mannheim
in December 2000. Experimental sessions were conducted individually. All 55 partici-
pants spent about 2 hours in the laboratory. They made, on average, 157 forecasts, and
completed on average one forecast every 44 seconds. Instructions given to participants
3We have introduced this payment scheme to simultaneously encourage participants to think about
their forecasts, but also to remain active.
4All stimulus data used in the experiment were taken from the OECD (2000) database “Fiscal Positions
and Business Cycle”.
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Figure 3: Stimulus data (as G over T )
are reported in Appendix B.
3 A preliminary look at the data
In this section we give a preliminary analysis of participants’ expectations in the two
treatments. Fig. 5-7 graph the expected changes for public expenditure and for taxes
versus the actual changes of the two fiscal variables: namely, ∆GEit = G
Ei
t −G
Ei
t−1 versus
∆Gt = Gt − Gt−1 in the Tt and Gt treatment (Fig. 5); and ∆T
Ei
t = T
Ei
t − T
Ei
t−1 versus
∆Tt = Tt − Tt−1 in the Tt and Gt treatment and the Tt only treatment (Fig. 6 and
7, respectively). The diagrams show that, in both treatments and in regard to both
fiscal variables, subjects’ expectations depend on the past values of the variables to be
forecasted: in particular, subjects seem to attach the largest weight to the last realized
value.
As a first step to assess the extent to which subjects follow a ‘pure’ adaptive scheme,
consider an hypothetical participant A who predicts the fiscal variables on the basis of the
simplest first-order adaptive rule T EAt = Tt−1 and G
EA
t = Gt−1, for taxes and expenditure
respectively.
For each country j, the adaptive scheme generates a mean square forecast error
(MSFE) ma,j := MSFE(T
EA,j
t − T
j
t ) = MSFE(∆T
j
t ) and similarly for G, where a stands
for adaptive, j indicates the country, and MSFE(xt) := ((n− 6)
−1
∑n
t=7 x
2
t )
1/2.
Similar calculation are performed on the actual predictions of agent i; this de-
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            Finland
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Figure 5: Expected changes for public expenditure versus actual changes
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Figure 6: Expected changes for taxes versus actual changes in the Tt and Gt treatment
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Figure 7: Expected changes for taxes versus actual changes in the Tt only treatment
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fines mi,j := MSFE(T
Ei,j
t − T
j
t ). Let {j1, ..., jpi} be the set indices of the countries
predicted by agent i, where pi is the number of these countries. We next calculate
MSFEi = p
−1
i
∑pi
c=1 MSFEi,jc and MSFEa,i = p
−1
i
∑pi
c=1 MSFEa,jc. This generates a set
of values {MSFEi}
m
i=1 for the actual average MSFE and a set {MSFEa,i}
m
i=1 for the adap-
tive average MSFE. Fig. 8 shows the cumulative distributions of the mean squared errors
of the adaptive model (dotted line) and of actual forecasts (solid line)5.
We find a somehow puzzling result: in both treatments the MSFE of the actual fore-
casts are significantly larger than the MSFE of the adaptive model. The evidence is
particularly strong in regard to the predictions for taxes6.
While the evidence may witness the complexity of the task involved in the experiment,
it shouldn’t be dismissed lightly. It may be taken as a prima facie evidence that subjects
may in fact have a model of the real world in mind, though not necessarily the right
model.
Indeed there is a rapidly growing literature on “bounded rationality” in macroeco-
nomics (Sargent, 1993), dedicated to the search and understanding of the behavioural
foundation of the process of expectations formation. This literature started from the dis-
satisfaction with the standard definition of rational expectations (Pesaran, 1987), while
focusing on so called schemes of augmented-adaptive behaviour as learning models. Start-
ing from the 1980s, these schemes have spawned a very large literature analysing the con-
ditions for, and the forms of, convergence to rational expectations equilibria in the context
of self-referential general equilibrium economies (see Evans and Honkapohja, 2001, for a
comprehensive account of this literature). There are also various experiments7 conducted
5Note that, although the first order adaptive model is the same for each participants, participants play
different sets of countries. Therefore also the mean squared error of the adaptive model differs among
participants.
6A paired t-test conducted on the average differences between mean squared errors finds: t = 3.3979
with a p–value of 0.0022, in the case of expectations for expenditure; t = 6.7094 with a p–value less than
0.0001 in the case of expectations for taxes in the Tt and Gt treatment; and t = 8.5284 with a p–value
less than 0.0001, in the case of expectations for taxes in the Tt only treatment.
7See, e.g., Marimon and Sunder (1993), for a classical references, and Bernasconi and Kirchkamp
(2000) for a more recent study.
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in standard artificial setups corroborating and providing insights for the theoretical liter-
ature.
In the partial equilibrium context of the present experiment, the question of conver-
gence is clearly of a lesser interest. Conversely, there may be other behavioural aspects in
the process of expectations forming which cannot be fully investigated within a theoretical
general equilibrium economy; but which may be relevant in real economies depending of
the context and of the objects of expectation.
The experiment described above allows to take a more general behavioural approach,
since (unlike in standard setups) in the present experiment the DGP underlying the stim-
uli data is real, though not known. The latter characteristic, while providing experimental
conditions similar to the ones in the real world, requires the econometric analysis of the re-
sponses as well as of the treatment data. In the remaining body of the paper, we develop a
joint model of stimuli and of expectation data, through which we discuss the meaning and
implications of different expectations schemes (rational, adaptive, augmented-adaptive),
consider and estimate properties of field data, check how these features are perceived by
subjects in the experiment, and possibly provide some interpretations of agents’ poorer
performance relatively to the first-order adaptive scheme.
4 Modelling the experiment
This section discusses the joint modelling of the stimuli and of expectation data. In order
to simplify the analysis we specify a model on each single country separately. This choice
corresponds to a limited information context in simultaneous systems of equations. In a
complete system, i.e. one containing all country-specific subsystems, one could envisage
several effects (variance components) associated with each individual, which are now
discarded in the analysis.
While the limited information context leaves room for improvement in efficiency for
estimation and testing, it delivers more robust inference, i.e. consistent estimates even
under misspecification of some other country specific subsystem. This appears highly
desirable.
Each individual i provides forecasts yi,t on the basis of the knowledge of the history
of stimuli Xt−1 := (x1, ..., xt−1)
′, where xt = (Tt, Gt)
′. Let m indicate the number of
individuals, i = 1, ..., m . Recall that yi,t = (T
Ei
t , G
Ei
t )
′ in the Tt and Gt treatment and
yi,t = T
Ei
t in the Tt only treatment. Let zi,t := (y
′
i,t, x
′
t)
′ be the data vector involved in
the prediction for agent i at time t. Let Zi,t−1 indicate the history of z
j
i,s up to time
t − 1, Zi,t−1 := (zi,1, ..., zi,t−1)
′, which represents the relevant information set available to
individual i in the expectation formation for the next period.
Consider also the vector wt := (y
′
t, x
′
t)
′ := (y′1,t, y
′
2,t....,y
′
m,t, x
′
t)
′ containing all predic-
tions performed by all agents at time t − 1 along with the variables to be predicted.
The prediction variables are grouped in the vector yt := (y
′
1,t, y
′
2,t....,y
′
m,t)
′. Let also
Wt−1 := (w
′
1, ..., w
′
t−1)
′ indicate the complete history of stimuli and predictions of all
agents. We next state restrictions on the DGP of the joint process {wt}
∞
t=1 that are
consistent with the experimental setup.
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4.1 Assumptions
Given the sequential structure of the experiment, we decompose the probability measure
of the stochastic process {wt}
∞
t=1 sequentially, as in Engle, Hendry, and Richard (1983),
into the product of L(wt|Wt−1). Here and in the following L(·|Wt−1) indicates conditional
probability given Wt−1. This allows to define the DGP of the process by its transition
probabilities.
We assume that the DGP for wt can be taken to be a Vector Autoregressive process
(VAR), A(L)wt = µ + t where t are i.i.d. N(0, Ω) across t and A(L) =
∑k
`=0 A`L
` is
the autoregressive polynomial in the lag operator L, A0 := I, the identity matrix. This
assumption is summarised as follows.
Assumption 1 The law of wt conditional on Wt−1, L(wt|Wt−1) is Gaussian with mo-
ments
E(∆wt|Wt−1) = µ + Πwt−1 +
k−1∑
`=0
Γ`∆wt−` V (wt|Wt−1) = Ω.
where Π := −A(1), Γ` := −
∑k
i=`+1 Ai, and µ is a vector of constants.
Several remarks are in order here. First of all, assumption 1 states that the DGP
of the variables observed in the field xt is nested within a VAR assumption for wt.
It should be noted that this excludes non-linear behaviour in xt, which (as antic-
ipated in the introduction) is viewed as disputable by some (see e.g., Bohn, 1998,
Giavazzi, Jappelli, and Pagano, 2000, and references therein). We consider the issue of
nonlinearity in some details in Section 7.
The assumption of normality may appear also restrictive. It is adopted here for con-
venience and can be dropped when one resorts to time-asymptotics. We note, however,
that for moderate temporal sample size this assumption is hard to test and reject.
Mostly important, we emphasise that most panel data models do not start with a VAR
as a reference model, but rather directly from a collection of single equations, one of each
individual. This is not advisable in the present context, for various reasons. Firstly, wt
contains the stimuli, which are likely to have obvious interactions. As suggested above,
the econometric analysis of the stimuli is just as important as the one of the responses,
and hence a multivariate approach for the modelling of xt is mandatory. Moreover, the
present VAR approach allows to view the links between the information set Zi,t−1 and
the prediction yi,t directly as parameters of the joint model and it includes the univariate
standard regression model as a special case.
Obviously, starting with a VAR as reference model, while very general, leaves room
for too many parameters; in the present case, it also permits variables in the field to be
influenced by data in the experiment, an issue which we address in the next assumption.
Assumption 2 The DGP of the stimuli xt conditional on Wt−1 does not depend on past
prediction variables ys for any s = 1, ...t− 1, i.e. L(∆xt|Wt−1) = L(∆xt|Xt−1).
Under assumption 2, yt does not Granger-cause xt (see e.g.
Engle, Hendry, and Richard, 1983). This assumption makes sense in this experi-
mental setting, where the stimuli were generated by natural experiments well before
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the lab experiment was performed. The assumption makes also transparent that the
VAR model we are considering here is cast in a partial equilibrium context, in which,
in particular, the perceived laws of motion for taxes and public expenditure have no
feedback on the respective actual laws of motion.
In the following, blocks of the Π, Γ` and Ω matrices corresponding to the vari-
ous components of wt are indicated with the subscripts 1, ..., m, x conformably with
wt := (y
′
1,t, y
′
2,t....,y
′
m,t, x
′
t)
′. The subscript y is used to group the first m blocks of pre-
diction variables together: Γ`,1x is e.g. the block of coefficients of xt−` in the expression
for E(∆y1,t|Wt−1), while Πxy is the block of coefficients of (∆y
′
1,t−1, ...∆y
′
m,t−1)
′ in the
expression for E(∆xt|Wt−1)
8.
Under Assumption 1, it is well known that Assumption 2 holds if and only if Πxy = 0
and Γ`,xy = 0 for all ` = 1, .., k − 1. This translates Assumption 2 into a parametric
restriction, which is later exploited in model specification.
We next wish to incorporate information on the relation among the prediction variables
yi,t across agents. Given the experimental setup, it is natural to assume that forecasts are
independent across agents, given the public information available.
Assumption 3 Let j be different from i;
a) the DGP of the forecast L(∆yi,t|Wt−1) does not depend on the forecast made by
other agents, i.e. on yj,s for any time in the past s = 1, ...t− 1.
b) Moreover ∆yi,t and ∆yj,t are independent conditionally on Wt−1.
This assumption formalises the experimental setup where individual forecasts are per-
formed independently of each other. Under Assumption 1, observe that Assumption
3 a) holds if and only if Πyy = diag(Π11, ..., Πmm), Γ`,yy = diag(Γ`,11, ..., Γ`,mm) for all
` = 1, .., k−1; while Assumption 3 b) holds if and only if Ωyy = diag(Ω11, ..., Ωmm). Again
this translates Assumption 3 into parametric restrictions, which are later exploited in
model specification.
The structure implied by the three Assumptions above can be used to derive two sub-
systems, a field system for the stimuli xt, and a lab system for the prediction variables yt.
This is done in the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 Let Assumption 1 and 2 hold; then
• the field sub-system DGP for xt, L(∆xt|Wt−1) = L(∆xt|Xt−1), is Gaussian with
variance matrix Ωxx and mean
E(∆xt|Xt−1) = µx + Πxxxt−1 +
k−1∑
`=1
Γ`,xx∆xt−`. (4)
• If moreover Assumption 3 holds, the lab sub-system DGP for yt given the past,
L(∆yt|Wt−1), is Gaussian with independent components, i.e. L(∆yt|Wt−1) can be
8Note that the conditional expectation operator E(·|Wt−1) and the prediction performed by the agents
do not necessarily coincide.
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decomposed in the product of L(∆yi,t|Wt−1) for i = 1, ..., m, where L(∆yi,t|Wt−1) =
L(∆yi,t|Zi,t−1) is Gaussian with variance Ωii and conditional mean
E(∆yi,t|Wt−1) = E(∆yi,t|Zi,t−1) =
= µi + (Πii : Πix)zi,t−1 +
k−1∑
`=1
(Γ`,ii : Γ`,ix)∆zi,t−`. (5)
and Ωyy = diag(Ω11, ..., Ωmm). Recall that zi,t := (y
′
i,t, x
′
t)
′.
Proof. The results hold by standard properties of the Gaussian distribution.
The Proposition clarifies that the model nests a marginal VAR for xt, which will be
the basis for the analysis of stimuli data. Moreover, yt is a VARX where the stimuli xt
act as exogenous variables.
Two issues of the greatest interest here concern the process of expectations forming and
the issue of cointegration and direction of causality between fiscal variables as occurring
in the field and as perceived in the lab. These are analysed in the following subsections.
4.2 Expectation schemes
The restricted VAR discussed in the previous section has implications regarding the for-
mation of expectations. In this section we illustrate rational, adaptive and augmented-
adaptive expectations within the present context.
We start from rational expectations. The optimisation problem given trough equations
(1) and (2) implies a quadratic loss function. For a quadratic loss function and a given
information set the optimal predictor is given by conditional expectations (Muth, 1960).
Expectations are called rational if they coincide with the ones formed under the DGP
(see e.g. Pesaran, 1987). One can then calculate rational expectations by computing the
conditional expectations of xt given the relevant information set.
The implied specific form of rational expectations is repeated in the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 5 (Rational expectations) Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold; the rational
expectation on ∆xt given any of the information sets Xt−1, Wt−1, Z
i
t−1 is given by
g(Xt−1) := E(∆xt|Wt−1) = E(∆xt|Xt−1) = E(∆xt+1|Zi,t−1) =
µx + Πxxxt−1 +
k−1∑
`=1
Γ`,xx∆xt−`.
Proof. Under Assumption 2, the information contained in Wt−1 or Zi,t−1 in excess
of the past history of x (Xt−1) is irrelevant, so that the various conditional expectations
coincide. The marginal DGP for xt is Gaussian with the above conditional expectations
(see eq. (4) in Proposition 4).
Let a superscript 1 indicate the first component of a vector; y1i,t, the first component
in yi,t, is a representative expectation variable, and assume that y
1
i,t represents a forecast
of x1t , the first component in xt. The form of the rational expectations on proposition 5
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provides the yardstick to measure the degree of rationality present in actual forecasts. In
particular, for rational expectations to hold one expects to find E(∆y1i,t|Zi,t−1) = g
1(Xt−1),
i.e. that the observed expectations are rational on average. If observed expectations were
exactly rational one would expect ∆yi,t = g(Xt−1) almost surely; we here allow for some
idiosyncratic error in the observed expectations, and take E(∆y1i,t|Zi,t−1) = g
1(Xt−1) as a
test of rational expectations. Deviations from this equality are taken as departure from
rationality of expectations.
One alternative formation process of expectations is the adaptive scheme, as originated
in the 1950s by the works of Cagan (1956), Friedman (1957) and Nerlove (1958). We
employ here the following definition.
Definition 6 (Adaptive expectations) An adaptive scheme is any bivariate transfer
function of the form
E(∆y1i,t|Zi,t−1) = a(L)y
1
i,t−1 + b(L)x
1
t + c
where a(L) and b(L) are finite scalar polynomials of the lag operator L, and c is a constant.
We emphasise the bivariate nature of the adaptive scheme9: in particular, under adap-
tive expectations, one would expect that only past values of the forecasted variable x1t and
of its forecast y1i,t enter in the expectation process for y
1
i,t. Thus, if other variables enter
in the estimated equation for ∆y1i,t, this is evidence against a purely adaptive scheme and
possibly in favour of a more general class of models known as augmented-adaptive.
Definition 7 (Augmented-adaptive expectations) An augmented-adaptive scheme
is any multivariate transfer function of the form
E(∆y1i,t|Zi,t−1) = C(L)zi,t−1 + c
where C(L) :=
∑p
`=1 C`L
` is a finite order matrix polynomial of the lag operator L, and c
is a constant, zi,t := (y
′
i,t, x
′
t)
′.
As noted in Section 3, augmented-adaptive schemes are also referred to as boundedly
rational learning models (see, e.g. Pesaran, 1987 and Sargent, 1993). We are interested
in them here since they nest both rational and simple adaptive schemes; therefore they
offer the natural setting to test for both types of expectations processes.
The next section discusses cointegration and causality restrictions on the subsystems
(4), (5).
4.3 Cointegration and causality
In the following, we enquire the possibility of cointegration (CI) in the vector wt under
Assumptions 1 and 2, and state the expected long run properties of stimuli and predictions.
The integration properties of the series do not interfere with the analysis of the degree
of rationality of expectations, but rather offer additional opportunities in the study of
expectation formation.
The following proposition states CI restrictions, and focuses on the Equilibrium Cor-
rection Mechanisms (ECM) (see Hendry, 1995) of the two subsystems.
9See Pesaran (1987) for many variations nested within this general definition.
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Proposition 8 Let wt be at most I(1) with CI rank equal to r; this implies Π = αβ
′, with
α and β full column rank matrices with rank r. Under Assumptions 1, 2, the CI space β
and the adjustment coefficients α can be represented as follows
αβ ′ =
(
αy1
0
)
β ′1w + αw2
(
0 β ′2x
)
(6)
=
(
αy1 αy2
0 αx2
)(
β ′1y β
′
1x
0 β ′2x
)
=
(
αy1β
′
1y αy1β
′
1x + αy2β
′
2x
0 αx2β
′
2x
)
,
where the 2 blocks of columns in α and β have full rank equal to r1, r2, and r = r1 + r2.
Hence
• the ECM terms in the autonomous VAR system for xt are αx2β
′
2xxt, while the ones
that appear in the VARX subsystem for yt are αy1β
′
1wwt + αy2β
′
2xxt;
• the CI rank of the autonomous VAR system xt is equal to r2;
• under Assumptions 3 αy1β
′
1y has a block-diagonal structure of the form αy1 =
diag(α11, ..., αmm), βy1 = diag(β11, ..., βmm).
Proof. Mosconi and Giannini (1992) prove (6), see also Johansen (1995), section
5.6. Note that we exclude I(2) behaviour. Under Assumptions 3 one has that Πyy =
diag(Π11, ..., Πmm), which can be decomposed into αy1β
′
1y with block-diagonal structure
of the form αy1 = diag(α11, ..., αmm), βy1 = diag(β11, ..., βmm) where Πii = αiiβ
′
ii.
Proposition 8 clarifies that the analysis of the autonomous VAR for the stimuli allows
to make inference on part of the cointegrating space, the one spanned by βx2. We observe
that the structure of the restricted joint VAR allows the expectation variables to possibly
respond to the disequilibrium errors β ′2xxt in any way, including the one characterising the
ECM in the field, with coefficients αx2. This behaviour would be consistent with rational
expectations.
The ECM of the expectation variables possibly contains r1 additional CI vectors. One
such CI vector could be of the form y1i,t − x
1
t , i.e. could describe the expectation error.
Adjustment to this expectation error is expected in an adaptive scheme.
The comparison of the field and expectation sub-systems allows to evaluate the pres-
ence and direction of causality, both in the real-world data and in their perception by the
agents in the expectations data. Significant coefficients on taxes within the equation for
spending are taken as evidence of causality from taxes to spending, and vice versa.
It can be stressed that in the lab sub-system one can also investigate the presence and
direction of causality from the field data to the expectation variables. This is of particular
interest in order to evaluate possible differences between the perceived and real directions
of causality in the field and in the lab.
In the next section we illustrate in greater details the type of cointegrating and causal
relationships which may be expected between and within the two models. We do it while
summarising the various steps of the econometric analysis performed on the data.
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5 Empirical specification and inference
The econometric specification described in the previous sections allows to perform the
empirical analysis in two stages: the first one on the field sub-system, the second one on
the expectation data.
5.1 Specification of the field model (stimuli)
Visual inspection (see Section 2) and evidence in the literature suggest that the stimuli
data xt := (Tt, Gt)
′ are integrated of order 1, I(1). Because xt contains the ratio of taxes
and expenditure to total GDP, xt := (Tt, Gt)
′, we expect the system xt not to contain a
linear trend.
A natural parametrisation of the sub-system is then
∆xt = αx2(β
′
2xxt−1 + ρ) +
k−1∑
`=1
Γ`,xx∆xt−` + xt, (7)
where µx = αx2 · ρ has been assumed to exclude linear trends (see Johansen, 1995).
Versions of this basic model have been analysed quite extensively in the empirical time
series analysis on fiscal policy. Two issues have been considered with particular attention:
the sustainability of fiscal policy and the direction of causality between fiscal variables.
Since Trehan and Walsh (1991) and Hakio and Rush (1991), a classical method to
address the first issue investigates cointegration between taxes and public expenditure
inclusive of interest payments: in short, cointegration tests of sustainability are based on
the idea that solvency requires the budget deficit to be stationary10. We follow a standard
procedure to test for cointegration.
We start determining the lags order k of the field VAR: for each country, we begin
with k = 5 and then restrict the order eliminating lags which are not statistical significant
and checking for absence of correlation in the residuals. The Johansen (1995) procedure
is used to test for the rank r2 of the system, and possibly to estimate the cointegrating
vector β2x. We use the LR trace test for H0 : r2 = 0 versus H1 : r2 = 1, and exclude
the case of a stationary system r2 = 2, where both taxes and expenditure are stationary
in levels. This assumption is justified by previous studies and informal inspection of the
graphs of the series; see Fig. 3 and 4 with stimulus data in Section 2.
We rely on standard n-asymptotic tables, despite the limited time span of the data
set. This reflects the unavailability of finite sample size quantiles, and it is also consistent
with the inference agents could possibly perform in the experiment.
10Quintos (1995) clarifies that stationarity is in fact a strong solvency condition. In particular, he
shows that the No Ponzi Game on public deficits is satisfied when the budget is integrated of order one
and therefore distinguishes between strong and weak forms of solvency (on this, see also Bergman, 2001).
We also note that, empirically, it has been proved difficult to accept sustainability in most countries
(see references in Bohn, 1998, for the US; and see, e.g., Manasse, 1996, and the results section below for
international evidence). Recently, Bohn (1998), and Sarno (2001) have adopted econometric approach
which allow for nonlinearity in the adjustment process of fiscal policy; and have reach results supporting
sustainability.
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For the countries for which r2 = 1, we estimate the CI vector in the form β
′
2xxt =
Tt + γGt imposing the normalisation to 1 of the coefficient of taxes, and testing whether
the corresponding spending parameter γ = −1 . The ML estimate γ̂ of γ is later used in
the analysis of the lab sub-system11.
The second empirical issue analysed within equation (7) concerns the direction of
causality between taxes and public expenditure. This is also a classical theme in pub-
lic finance. We here recall four fundamental hypotheses on the relationships between
government expenditures and revenues.
1. The ‘tax and spend hypothesis’: it is the idea that taxes proceed spend-
ing. This has been advocated by the Leviathan State writers (Buchanan, 1977;
Buchanan and Wagner, 1978), and as an implication of improvements in the techno-
logical capacity of raising revenues, which according to Friedman (1978) will always
lead to expenditure increases, and never to budget cuts.
2. The ‘spend and tax hypothesis’: according to this view politicians and public ser-
vants manage to systematically convince the public of the benefits of additional
public spending, which may only be achieved through tax increases. This story
is the most ‘behavioural’. For Buchanan (1960), its foundations are rooted in the
theory of fiscal illusion, dating back to the nineteenth century ‘Italian School of
Public Finance’. Peacock and Wiseman (1979) embrace this view. This hypothesis
is also implied by Barro’s models of both Ricardian equivalence (Barro, 1974) and
tax-smoothing (Barro, 1979) with exogenous public spending12.
3. Bidirectional causality: this follows when taxes and expenditure are simultane-
ously determined according to the standard economic calculus of weighting the
marginal costs and the marginal benefits of public services (Musgrave, 1966;
Meltzer and Richard, 1981).
4. Lack of causality: this may sometimes also arise when taxes and public expenditure
are decided upon by distinct institutional authorities (Hoover and Sheffrin, 1992).
Tests of the presence and direction of causality can be based on the field sub-model
(7). In particular, when the series in xt := (Tt, Gt)
′ are cointegrated, it is well known
that at least one between Tt and Gt adjusts to disequilibrium with respect to the long run
relation. The four cases above corresponds to vector αx2 of the forms (0, ?)
′, (?, 0)′, (?, ?)′
and (0, 0)′ (with ? indicating a non-zero coefficient), and provide tests of Granger long-
run causality. Similarly short run-causality can be simply checked looking for significant
off-diagonal coefficients in the matrices Γ`,xx. Mixed results have been obtained regarding
causality, see, e.g., Garcia and Henin (1999) and Payne (1998).
Again here, we emphasise that in the present paper we are not interested in testing for
causality (or for sustainability of fiscal policy) per se; but we are interested in whether and
how properties of fiscal policy found in the stimuli are perceived in the lab-subsystems of
expectations variables.
11Note that the generated regressor bias has no effect on the n-asymptotics for the lab sub-system,
because γ̂ is superconsistent, γ̂ − γ = Op(n
−1) compared to the n1/2 consistency of the parameters of
stationary variables.
12In the former case, one may expect causality to hold especially in the long-run.
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5.2 Specification of the lab model (expectations)
Under assumptions 1, 2, and 3, the lab sub-system can be decomposed into m individual
sub-systems of the form
∆yi,t = µi + αi1β
′
1zi
(
yi,t−1
xt−1
)
+ αi2(β
′
2xxt−1) +
k−1∑
`=1
(Γ`,ii : Γ`,ix)
(
∆yi,t−`
∆xt−`
)
+ yt, (8)
where yi,t := (T
Ei
t , G
Ei
t )
′ in the Tt and Gt treatment or yi,t := T
Ei
t in the Tt only treatment,
and xt := (Tt, Gt)
′. In the following we illustrate the inference procedure only for yi,t :=
(T Eit , G
Ei
t )
′, with obvious modifications for the Tt only treatment. Equation (8) shows
how the expectation variables may react to the field disequilibrium error β ′2xxt−1, which
is labelled ECMTG. Additional CI relations may exist through the term αi1β
′
1zi
which is a
2× 4 matrix of rank r1i ≤ 2.
Inference on the number of additional CI vectors r1i can be performed for fixed values
of the ECM term ECMTG obtained in the marginal field system
13. In this paper we take
a different and simpler approach. The hypothesis of adaptive behaviour in the formation
of expectation suggests to calculate the expectation errors (T Eit − Tt, G
Ei
t − Gt)
′ as a
possible choice of extra CI relations β ′1zi(y
′
i,t−1, x
′
t−1)
′. Because these extra relations do
not contain any parameter to be estimated, it is simple to inspect the implied time-series
of the forecast errors in order to infer if they are stationary or I(1). This can be done
visually or through univariate unit root tests. Both the tests and the graphical analysis14
suggest that the forecast errors are stationary.
This leads us to conclude that the sub-system (8) could be rewritten as follows
(
∆T Eit
∆GEit
)
= µi + αi

 T Eit−1 − Tt−1GEit−1 −Gt−1
Tt−1 + γ̂Gt−1

 + k−1∑
`=1
(Γ`,ii : Γ`,ix)
(
∆yi,t−`
∆xt−`
)
+ ε̂yt, (9)
where αi := (αi1 : αi2) is the adjustment coefficient, ε̂yt := εyt − αi2(γ̂ − γ)Gt−1.
Eq. (9) involves only stationary variables and delivers standard n1/2 asymptotics for
(µi, αi, Γ`,ii, Γ`,ix, Ωii) (see Johansen, 1995, chapter 13.5).
The analysis of eq. (9) permits to discriminate among the different expectation forma-
tion processes detailed in Section 4.2. In particular, if subject i has rational expectations,
one would expect the equations for ∆yi,t to collapse to the specification of the marginal
system ∆xt. This can be checked by testing if the coefficients of the variables that are
present in (9) and not in (7) are equal to zero.
Of specific interest is to investigate whether and how the long-run adjustment in the
conditional model αi2 relate to the one in the marginal model αx2, since this coefficient
indicates if agents perceive and adjust to the actual cointegration characteristics in the
data.
13Paruolo (2001) has derived the asymptotics of LR trace test for CI rank when some CI relation are
known. These results are not directly applicable here because the ECM term ECMTG has been estimated
in the field sub-system and because (8) is a sub-system.
14Both are not reported for brevity.
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On the contrary if expectations are adaptive, one would expect only ∆x1t to enter
the equation for ∆y1i,t, where a superscript 1 indicates one stimulus variable and the
corresponding forecast. If other variables appear in the equation for ∆y1i,t, this is consistent
with an augmented-adaptive scheme. Again this can be tested via zero restrictions on
coefficients.
Finally, questions of perceived causality between taxes and public expenditure can
be addressed by inspection of parameters in (9), which nest causality links from xt−`
and yi,t−` to yi,t. In particular the off-diagonal elements in the Γ`,ix matrices and the
αi2 coefficients determine the direction of causality from the field to the lab, while the
off-diagonal elements in the Γ`,ii matrices and the αi1 coefficients regulate the ones from
the past expectations on present expectations. Causal links in αs pertain adjustment to
the long run equilibrium and are termed ‘long run causality’ links, while the ones in Γs
are called ‘short run causality’ links.
The individual lab sub-systems (9) may be estimated one at the time or jointly. Joint
estimation under some homogeneity restriction allows to exploit the panel dimension m of
the data to increase efficiency. In the empirical analysis we assumed all individual-specific
parameters to be equal across agents, (µi, αi, Γ`,ii, Γ`,ix, Ωii) = (µ∗, α∗, Γ`,∗, Γ`,∗x, Ω∗∗), ob-
taining the maximal reduction in number of parameters15.
6 Empirical evidence
The result of the cointegration analysis of the stimulus data are given in Table 2. We find
that two lags (that is, models with one lagged difference) are enough to characterise the
dynamic structure of the series for most of the countries considered in the experiments
(exceptions are Austria, k = 3; Finland, k = 5; Italy, k = 4; and Portugal, k = 3). For
9 countries (Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden
and UK), we find that taxes and public expenditures are cointegrated; for 6 (Belgium,
Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland and Spain) we find that they are not. Among the
former and consistently with the general evidence reported in the literature (see, e.g.
Manasse, 1996), we found that the condition for stationarity of the budget γ̂ = −1 is
rejected for most countries. In fact, it is accepted only for Italy, somehow surprisingly
given that Italy is notoriously considered a country with very easy public spending16.
Table 3 summaries the main findings of the inference on both the field and lab systems
in the two experimental treatments. (The complete parameter estimates are given in
Appendix A). In considering the results, recall that in the Tt only treatment, in which
agents forecast taxes, expectations on GEit are not available. Thus, inference results on
the lab system for the Tt only treatment is limited to the equation for ∆y
1
t = ∆T
Ei
t+1.
The first part of the table reports, for the field and for the lab, the coefficients of
responses to the field error correction term β ′2x(Tt, Gt)
′ (also indicated with ECMTG).
Consider first the field evidence (the first column in the Table). Among the nine countries
15We also performed a general to specific strategy; the selected models did not give substantial differ-
ences with respect to the results for the homogeneous case.
16Notice, however, that the hypothesis of no-cointegration for Italy was rejected only marginally with
a p-value of 0.09.
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Table 2: Results of cointegration analysis on stimulus data
Country VAR H0(r2 = 0) Rank Cointegrating Vector Test of the
(sample period) order versus (β ′2x, ρ) homogeneity
H1(r2 = 1) condition γ̂ = −1
Austria k = 3 42.5∗∗∗ r = 1 (1;−0.739;−10.385) −13.23∗∗∗
(1970-98)
Belgium k = 2 9.05 r = 0
(1970-98)
Denmark k = 2 15.92 r = 0
(1971-95)
Finland k = 5 27.99∗∗∗ r = 1 (1;−0.565;−21.436) −28.29∗∗∗
(1970-98)
France k = 2 15.92 r = 0
(1970-98)
Germany k = 2 19.40∗ r = 1 (1;−0.572;−17.863) −4.32∗∗
(1976-98)
Greece k = 2 14.37 r = 0
(1970-98)
Ireland k = 2 16.67 r = 0
(1970-98)
Italy k = 4 18.19∗ r = 1 (1;−0.892; 0) −1.72
(1970-98)
Netherlands k = 2 20.47∗∗ r = 1 (1;−0.606;−17.630) −13.51∗∗∗
(1970-98)
Norway k = 2 18.42∗ r = 1 (1;−1.051; 0) −3.52∗∗
(1970-98)
Portugal k = 3 49.12∗∗∗ r = 1 (1;−1.177; 13.667) −2.09∗
(1970-98)
Spain k = 2 16.10 r = 0
(1970-98)
Sweden k = 2 18.18∗ r = 1 (1 : −0.950; 0) −2.13∗
(1970-98)
UK k = 2 23.42∗∗ r = 1 (1;−0.922; 0) −9.18∗∗∗
(1970-98)
Legend: ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote rejection at, in the order, 10%, 5%, 1% significance level.
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Table 3: Summary of inference results
Vectors of responses to
ECMTG: Tt+γ̂Gt
Vectors of responses to
(ECMT
ET , ECMG
EG)′: β ′w1 · (yt−1, xt−1)
′
Direction of short run causality
inferred from Γl,xx and Γ`,ix
Field
αx2
Tt and Gt
treatment
αi2
Tt only
treatment
αi2
Tt and Gt
treatment
αi1
Tt only
treatment
αi1
Field
Tt and Gt
treatment
Tt only
treatment
Austria (0, 1.31) (0, 0) (0, ∗) ((−0.95, 0), (0,−0.73)) ((−0.94, ∗), ∗) T ↔ G T ← G T ← G
Belgium ((−0.73, 0), (0,−0.58)) ((−0.93, ∗), ∗) T ← G T ← G T ← G
Denmark ((−0.60, 0.1), (0,−0.54)) ((−0.69, ∗), ∗) T ← G T ← G
Finland (−0.96, 0) (0, 0) (−0.15, ∗) ((−0.68, 0.22), (0.58,−0.40)) ((−0.87, ∗), ∗) T ← G T ↔ G T ← G
France ((−0.74, 0), (0,−0.83)) ((−0.70, ∗), ∗) T ← G T ← G T ← G
Germany (−1.01, 0) (0, 0) (0, ∗) ((−0.96, 0.1), (0,−0.64)) ((−0.93, ∗), ∗) T ← G T ← G
Greece ((−0.86, 0), (0,−0.90)) ((−0.87, ∗), ∗) T ← G
Ireland ((−0.66, 0), (0,−0.89)) ((−0.67, ∗), ∗) T ← G T ← G
Italy (−0.16, 0) (−0.11, 0) (0, ∗) ((−0.63, 0), (0,−0.66)) ((−0.85, ∗), ∗) T ← G T ← G
Netherlands (−0.62, 0) (0, 0) (0, ∗) ((−0.51, 0), (0,−0.63)) ((−0.80, ∗), ∗) T ← G
Norway (0, 0.31) (0, 0.09) (0, ∗) ((−0.67, 0), (0.16,−0.65)) ((−0.73, ∗), ∗) T → G T → G T ← G
Portugal (0.29, 0.67) (0, 0.32) (0, ∗) ((−0.67, 0), (0.42,−0.50)) ((−0.76, ∗), ∗) T ↔ G T ← G T ← G
Spain ((−0.90, 0.08), (0,−0.62)) ((−0.54, ∗), ∗) T ← G T ← G
Sweden (0, 0.28) (0, 0.08) (0, ∗) ((−0.79, 0), (0,−0.75)) ((−0.67, ∗), ∗) T → G T ← G
UK (0, 0.44) (−0.06, 0) (−0.07, ∗) ((−0.77, 0), (0.29,−0.73)) ((−0.79, ∗), ∗) T → G T ← G
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for which cointegration between taxes and expenditure was found, expenditure is long-run
adjusting to taxes in four cases (Austria, Norway, Sweden and UK); taxes are adjusting to
expenditure in others four (Finland, Germany, Italy and Netherlands); and in one country
(Portugal) there is bidirectional adjustment.
Results from the experiments show that subjects fail to perceive the CI characteristics
of the field data. First of all, in regards to both experimental treatments, we note that in
many cases the lab responses αi2 to ECMTG are not significantly different from zero and
even when they are, αi2 are in any case quite small
17.
Consider now the direction of perceived long-run causality. In the Tt and Gt treatment,
in which subjects forecasted both taxes and expenditure, subjects do not perceive any long
run adjustment in four countries (Austria, Finland, Germany and Netherlands); in one
case (UK), they perceive adjustment in the wrong direction; and in other four cases, they
seem to correctly perceive the adjustment process (from expenditure to taxes in Italy, and
from taxes to expenditure in Norway, Portugal and Sweden). In the Tt only treatment,
we don’t know how participants perceive the dynamics of the series of public expenditure.
Notice, however, that out of the six countries in which adjustment in the field was from
expenditure to taxes, only in the case of Finland participants seem to correctly perceive
the direction of causality. In the case of UK, again subjects perceive a wrong direction.
The last part of table 3 shows the results of tests on Granger causality between taxes
and expenditure, as it can be inferred from inspection of the off-diagonal coefficients of
matrix Γl,xx and from Γ`,ix for the field and lab systems, respectively. Field evidence
shows that in 8 countries (Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain,
UK), causality runs in neither direction; in 3 (Belgium, Finland and France), causality
runs from expenditure to taxes; in 2 (Norway and Sweden), from taxes to expenditure;
and in 2 (Austria and Portugal), causality is bidirectional.
Lab evidence indicates that subjects have a quite different perception regarding
Granger causality between taxes and expenditure. In particular, with reference to both
experiments, we find that there is an overwhelming tendency of subjects perceiving a
causality running from expenditure to taxes: in the Tt and Gt treatment, this holds for 9
countries over 15; in the Tt only treatment, it holds for all the 15 countries. Moreover, we
note that the short-run adjustments coefficients are not negligible (see estimates reported
in Appendix A).
Several remarks are in order regarding this evidence. Firstly, it shows (more than
the weak evidence on cointegration) that the model of expectations forming which best
describes the data is of an augmented-adaptive type. Subjects expectations are not for
this, however, closer to be perfect, than what it would be implied by a purely adaptive
model.
In fact, the evidence may also contribute to explain the relative poorer performance
of participants in the experiments relative to a purely adaptive agent, as reported in
Section 3. The middle part of Table 2 shows the estimates of the vector αy1 describing
how individual react in the long run to errors in the process of expectations forming
β ′1zi(y
′
i,t−1, x
′
t−1)
′ = (T Eit − Tt−1, G
Ei
t − Gt−1)
′ (also denoted (ECMT
ET, ECMG
EG)′). While
it is clear that subjects in the experiments react adaptively to errors, they do so differently
17Compare also the standard deviation of the estimated parameters, reported in the Tables 1-15 for
the individual countries in Appendix A.
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from a purely adaptive agent. In the latter case, one should find αi1 = I2, an identity
matrix of order 2. For all countries and in both experimental treatments we have that
the estimated diagonal parameters of αi1 are typically less than 1
18. In this regard, it
is perhaps of some interest to notice that in the Tt and Gt treatment, for which Table 2
shows that subjects indeed perceive a good deal of exogeneity in public expenditure, the
relative expectations seem also closer to those of a purely adaptive agents than in the case
of tax expectations (see Fig. 8 in Section 3).
The evidence of the direction in which subjects perceive causality, namely from taxes
to expenditure regardless of what occurs in the field, is also of interest. In particular, it
is consistent with the “spend and tax hypothesis”, which among the four classical views
recalled in Section 5.1 was accounted as the most behavioural. The evidence may also
have implication for theories studying the effects of fiscal policy. We come back to such
point at the end of the next section.
7 Misspecification tests for nonlinearity and anti-
Keynesian effects
The VAR approach pursued in the previous sections works under the maintained hypoth-
esis of a linear process for the time series considered. As intuition and some current
literature has documented (see Bohn, 1998, and Sarno, 2001), this hypothesis may con-
flict with the fact that fiscal policy is subject to various possible structural shifts and
discretionary interventions, which may introduce nonlinearity in fiscal policy.
We have controlled for misspecification biases due to nonlinearity in the field systems
by way of standard RESET tests. We haven’t found evidence of misspecification for the
spans of data given as stimulus to subjects in the experiment.
When the field systems are correctly specified, still a question of interest concerns
the response of the private sector’s expectations to situations in which, at some point in
time, some relevant shifts in the conduct of fiscal policy is observed. As emphasised by
some recent literature, under such conditions, a large intervention on the fiscal variables,
perhaps addressed to correct disequilibrium in the public budget, may be perceived by
the public as to imply lower taxation in the future, and therefore generate an expansion
in economic activity, rather than a contraction as predicted by a standard Keynesian
perspective.
Proposed originally by the Sachversta¨ndigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamt-
wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung 1981, this view has been made popular by
Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), who brought to the attention of the profession the
astonishing expansionary fiscal consolidations occurred in the mid 1980s in Denmark
and Ireland. Various subsequent literature has been developed on the circumstances and
conditions under which nonlinear effects of fiscal policy are more or less likely to occur19.
18This is also confirmed by formal t-tests (see in particular the standard deviations reported in Appendix
A).
19Developments in this field include Bertola and Drazen (1993), who focus on adjustments when public
expenditure reaches critical levels; and Sutherland (1997), who looks at critical debt levels. These studies
also emphasise the potential importance of political announcements or constraints for expectations to
24
Taking a pragmatic approach on the issue, Giavazzi, Jappelli, and Pagano (2000) have
defined periods of ‘large and persistent’ fiscal contractions and fiscal expansions as situ-
ations in which, for at least two consecutive years, the budget balance as a percentage
of GDP increase or decrease, respectively, by at least 1,5 point per year. Looking at two
panels of OECD and non-OECD data, the study reports widespread evidence of nonlinear
effects of fiscal policy.
However, as noted in the introduction, a problem with this approach is that a link
between the observed nonlinear effects of fiscal policy and the role of expectations can
only be inferred, but not really tested20.
We control for the possibility of nonlinear effects in the present experiment introducing
dummies in the equation (9) for expected taxes. Two dummies are introduced on the in-
tercept: one (dCONTR) activated in periods of “sizeable and persistent” fiscal contractions,
and the other (dEXP) activated in periods of “sizeable and persistent” fiscal expansions.
According to the view, we should expect the coefficients on dCONTR to be negative and
that on dEXP to be positive
21.
Table 4 reports the periods in which the two dummies were activated, with the related
evidence. (A fuller account of the evidence in Appendix A).
We counted 11 episodes of fiscal expansions (in 10 countries, with Sweden counting
for two), and 10 episodes of fiscal contractions (in 7 countries, with Ireland counting for
two and Sweden for three). In none of these episodes we find evidence consistent with
the predictions: in fact, almost always the dummies are non significant, in few cases they
appear with the wrong sign. The above evidence thus rejects the hypothesis of nonlinear
responses of expectations to ‘large and persistent’ changes in fiscal policy per se.
Conversely, the results reported in the previous section of subjects’ expectations con-
sistent with the “tax and spend hypothesis” may give indirect support to a different
interpretation of anti-Keynesian effects, which emphasizes the importance of the “com-
position” of fiscal adjustments. As especially argued by Alesina and Perotti and vari-
ous coauthors (see, e.g., Alesina and Perotti, 1997, and various references also quoted in
Alesina, Ardagna, Perotti, and Schiantarelli, 2002), this view suggests that in periods of
fiscal distress, only those adjustments that heavily rely on public expenditure cuts (better
if in government consumption, wage bill and transfers) may generate an expansion in
economic activity.
The reason is that only such adjustments may succeed in signalling to the public a
real determination to correct the budget, so to actually induce expectations of lower
taxation in the future. On the contrary, fiscal interventions based on tax increases
will most likely be perceived as an easy way out by the private sector. Note that
this theory is rooted in a supply-side interpretation of the effects of fiscal policy (see
e.g. Alesina, Ardagna, Perotti, and Schiantarelli, 2002) and does not require “ ‘special —
actually trigger nonlinear anti-Keynesian effects. Perotti (1999) has also a model in which fiscal policy
generates nonlinear effects, though in this latter case nonlinearities are not due to expectations, but to
distortionary taxation (as also in Blanchard, 1990) and credit constraints.
20An other problem is that heterogeneity in the cross-country panel can itself generate non-linearity
(see Kamps, 2001).
21This would in particular signal a negative and positive change in the drift of agents’ expectations
following periods of “large and persistent” fiscal contraction and fiscal expansion, respectively.
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Table 4: Evidence on expectations in episodes of “large and persistent” fiscal adjustments
Country Fiscal Expansions Fiscal Contractions
Episodes Evidence on dEXP Episodes Evidence on dCONTR
Tt and Gt treatment Tt only treatment Tt and Gt treatment Tt only treatment
Belgium ’80-81 not signif. not signif.
Denmark ’80-82 wrong sign (-) not signif. ’83-86 wrong sign (+) not signif.
Finland ’91-93; not signif. not signif. ’88-89 not signif. not signif.
France ’92-93 not signif. not signif.
Greece ’88-90 not signif. not signif. ’96-97 not signif. not signif.
Ireland ’78-80 wrong sign (-) not signif. ’83-84; ’88-87 not signif not signif
Norway ’91-92 not signif. not signif. ’94-96 not signif. not signif.
Spain ’81-82 not signif. not signif. ’97-96 not signif. not signif.
Sweden ’78-79; ’91-93 not signif. not signif. ’83-84; ’86-87; 94-96 not signif. wrong sign (+)
UK ’92-93 wrong sign (-) not signif.
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i.e. nonlinear — theories’ for large versus small changes if fiscal policy” (p. 586).
While the results of the previous section are obviously silent on the supply-side archi-
tecture underlying this view, the evidence clearly supports the argument that expectations
of lower taxation in the future may only be induced by public expenditure cuts.
8 Conclusions
In a famous taxonomy of the goal which may be pursued in the laboratory, Roth (1987)
suggests three categories to classify experiments in economics: the first is “speaking to
theorists”, the second is “searching for facts and meaning”, the third is “whispering in the
ears of princes”. The experiment described in the previous pages has especially pursued
the second goal, in a field — that of expectations on fiscal policy — in which very little
was apparently known.
We have now a better idea on how expectations on fiscal variables may be formed:
we have developed an econometric approach for the process of expectations forming,
which coherently arises from the DGP of the field stimuli; we have distinguished between
long-run and short-run effects, both of the stimuli and of past expectations; we found
that subjects behave adaptively, though they do not adjust perfectly to past expectation
errors, not even in the long run; we found that subjects follow an augmented-adaptive
model, which has revealed some innate inclination for subjects to believe that more public
expenditure requires more taxes; we found that this is a short-run causal relationship
holding regardless of the actual causal relationship between taxes and expenditure in the
field.
We believe that the latter is an interesting result, which may also have important policy
implications. We in particular noticed that it underlines a theory of anti-Keynesian effect
of fiscal policy based on the so called “composition view”. We have also tested whether
subjects’ expectations respond nonlinearly to large discretionary changes in fiscal policy;
but we haven’t found sign of such a behavior. This does not necessarily mean that
nonlinear effects of fiscal policy may not be relevant in the field; it however means that
if nonlinear effects occur, they might not be simply imputed to general characteristics of
fiscal policy per se, but may need other catalyzing factors, which may be political events,
announcements, perhaps news from the press or media broadcasting.
One may possibly find a way to control for some of such factors in richer experimen-
tal setups, which give information on political events or announcements from historical
records, as additional stimulus data; likewise, experiments giving more disaggregated
information regarding the composition of the public budget can provide more specific
evidence on the “composition view” of fiscal policy.
From a more general viewpoint, the results presented in this experiment credits the
dissatisfaction of many with the rational expectation hypothesis. We noticed that it
motivates much current research on the behavioral foundation of models of expectations
forming. The present approach provides a method to obtain observable expectations
which hinges directly on the way in which people may behave in the field.
Indeed, from a methodological perspective, the main novelty of the present approach is
the idea of using field and laboratory data complementarily. Experimental economics has
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grown substantially over the last two or three decades, as it is now a well-acknowledged
method through which decision theorists, game theorists and microeconomists have tested
and refined theoretical models in their respective fields of interest.
Relatively few experiments have instead been conducted in the field of macroeco-
nomics. The reason, probably, is that macroeconomists deal with real world questions to
a much greater degree than other economists, in the belief that laboratory experiments
cannot really answer such type of questions. “When an engineer wants to find out how
the temperature affects material’s conductivity, she builds an experiment in which she
changes the temperature, makes sure that everything else remains the same, and looks
at the change in conductivity. But macroeconomists who want to find out, for example,
how changes in the money supply affect aggregate activity cannot perform such controlled
experiments; they cannot make the world stop while they ask the central bank to change
the money supply” (Blanchard, 1997).
The approach pursued in this paper suggests that it is not necessary to make the
world stop to test macroeconomic models experimentally; but that using real world data
as stimulus for subjects in the experiments, it may be possible get evidence on interesting
and practically important macroeconomic issues.
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A Appendix - Country results
A.1 Summary Austria
Field Lab. - Treatments:
k=3; r=1; “T and G” “T only”
CV=(1; -0.730; -10.385) n. of subjects: 16 n. of subjects: 19
Sample period 1970-98 1977-98 1977-98
Dependent ∆T t ∆Gt ∆T
E
t ∆G
E
t ∆T
E
t
const 0.237 0.172 0.162
(5.30)*** (3.08)** (5.29)***
∆T Et−1
∆T Et−2
∆GEt−1 -0.071
(-2.09)**
∆GEt−2
∆T t−1 -0.562 -0.751 0.207 0.170
(-2.52)* (-2.12)* (2.96)** (2.73)**
∆T t−2
∆T t−3
∆Tt−4
∆Gt−1 0.355 0.513 0.210
(2.04)* (7.76)*** (7.13)***
∆Gt−2 0.318 0.705 0.123
(2.00)* (2.52)* (2.32)**
∆Gt−3
∆Gt−4
ECMTG 1.308
(3.11)**
ECMTT
E -0.949 -0.938
(-17.12)*** (-19.88)***
ECMGG
E -0.726
(-13.39)***
dEXP
(not incl.)
dCONTR
(not incl.)
adj. R2 0.17 0.23 0.75 0.75 0.88
Legend: k= var order; r= rank; CV= cointegration vector (T ;G; const);
*, **, *** denote, in the order, 5%, 1%, 0.1% significance level
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A.2 Summary Belgium
Field Lab. - Treatments:
k=2; r=0; “T and G” “T only”
no CV n. of subjects: 20 n. of subjects: 22
Sample period 1970-98 1977-98 1977-98
Dependent ∆T t ∆Gt ∆T
E
t ∆G
E
t ∆T
E
t
const 0.231 0.186
(4.92)*** (5.81)***
∆T Et−1 -0.100
(-2.77)**
∆T Et−2 -0.074 -0.065
(-2.77)** (-2.99)**
∆GEt−1 -0.133
(-4.22)***
∆GEt−2
∆T t−1 0.552 0.199
(6.79)** (3.99)***
∆T t−2
∆T t−3
∆Gt−1 0.261 0.372 0.101 0.829 0.24
(2.43)** (2.08)** (3.62)*** (13.28)*** (11.25)***
∆Gt−2
∆Gt−3
ECMTG
ECMTT
E -0.731 -0.925
(-10.89)*** (-22.29)***
ECMGG
E -0.573
(-10.71)***
dEXP
’80-81
dCONTR
(not incl.)
adj. R2 0.11 0.13 0.79 0.79 0.82
Legend: k= var order; r= rank; CV= cointegration vector (T ;G; const);
*, **, *** denote, in the order, 5%, 1%, 0.1% significance level
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A.3 Summary Denmark
Field Lab. - Treatments:
k=2; r=0; “T and G” “T only”
no CV n. of subjects: 15 n. of subjects: 17
Sample period 1971-97 1978-97 1978-97
Dependent ∆T t ∆Gt ∆T
E
t ∆G
E
t ∆T
E
t
const
∆T Et−1 -0.208 -0.086
(-4.47)*** (-2.80)**
∆T Et−2 -0.061
(0.022)**
∆GEt−1 -0.171
(-3.82)***
∆GEt−2 -0.062
(-2.09)*
∆T t−1 0.672 0.572
(6.85)*** (7.11)***
∆T t−2
∆T t−3
∆T t−4
∆Gt−1 0.297 0.929 0.110
(4.48)*** (10.33)*** (5.05)***
∆Gt−2
∆Gt−3
∆Gt−4
ECMTG
ECMTT
E -0.602 -0.687
(-8.03)*** (-9.86)***
ECMGG
E 0.089 -0.537
(2.11)* (-6.58)***
dEXP -0.494
’80-82 (-2.04)*
dCONTR 0.760
’83-86 (2.84)**
adj. R2 - - 0.82 0.82 0.89
Legend: k= var order; r= rank; CV= cointegration vector (T ;G; const);
*, **, *** denote, in the order, 5%, 1%, 0.1% significance level
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A.4 Summary Finland
Field Lab. - Treatments:
k=5; r=1; “T and G” “T only”
CV=(1; -0.565; -21.436) n. of subjects: 12 n. of subjects: 15
Sample period 1975-98 1977-98 1977-98
Dependent ∆T t ∆Gt ∆T
E
t ∆G
E
t ∆T
E
t
const
∆T Et−1 -0.229 -0.263
(-2.51)* (-3.75)***
∆T Et−2 -0.160
(-2.43)*
∆GEt−1
∆GEt−2 -0.100
(-2.92)**
∆T t−1 0.847 0.623 0.789 0.430
(4.00)*** (4.84)*** (4.72)*** (6.81)***
∆T t−2 0.514 0.259
(2.08)* (2.29)*
∆T t−3 0.228
(2.46)*
∆T t−4 0.528
(2.18)*
∆Gt−1 0.872 0.140 0.882 0.100
(4.68)*** (3.02)** (12.32)*** (3.68)***
∆Gt−2 -0.666 -0.468
(-3.28)** (-2.48)*
∆Gt−3 -0.166
(-4.82)***
∆Gt−4 -0.309
(-1.76)
ECMTG -0.953 -0.148
(-3.75)*** (-3.44)**
ECMTT
E -0.681 0.584 -0.872
(-6.07)*** (4.25)*** (-19.43)***
ECMGG
E 0.217 -0.395
(5.59)*** (-6.62)***
dEXP
’91-93
dCONTR
’88-89
adj. R2 0.36 0.43 0.79 0.82 0.80
Legend: k= var order; r= rank; CV= cointegration vector (T ;G; const);
*, **, *** denote, in the order, 5%, 1%, 0.1% significance level
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A.5 Summary France
Field Lab. - Treatments:
k=2; r=0; “T and G” “T only”
no CV n. of subjects: 12 n. of subjects: 10
Sample period 1972-98 1984-98 1984-98
Dependent ∆T t ∆Gt ∆T
E
t ∆G
E
t ∆T
E
t
const 0.160
(3.85)***
∆T Et−1
∆T Et−2
∆GEt−1
∆GEt−2
∆T t−1 0.475 0.415
(4.89)*** (4.17)***
∆T t−2
∆T t−3
∆Tt−4
∆Gt−1 0.358 0.444 0.124 0.514 0.180
(3.27)** (2.53)* (3.28)** (7.32)*** (4.94)**
∆Gt−2
∆Gt−3
∆Gt−4
ECMTG
ECMTT
E -0.739 -0.700
(-11.10)*** (-10.60)***
ECMGG
E -0.825
(-12.55)***
dEXP
’92-93
dCONTR
(not incl.)
adj. R2 0.04 -0.01 0.79 0.82 0.83
Legend: k= var order; r= rank; CV= cointegration vector (T ;G; const);
*, **, *** denote, in the order, 5%, 1%, 0.1% significance level
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A.6 Summary Germany
Field Lab. - Treatments:
k=2; r=1; “T and G” “T only”
CV=(1; -0.572; -17.863) n. of subjects: 11 n. of subjects: 14
Sample period 1976-98 1977-98 1977-98
Dependent ∆T t ∆Gt ∆T
E
t ∆G
E
t ∆T
E
t
const 0.169 0.278 0.099
(4.28)*** (3.86)*** (3.67)***
∆T Et−1 0.169
(2.87)**
∆T Et−2
∆GEt−1 -0.131
(-2.38)*
∆GEt−2
∆T t−1 0.192 0.127
(2.06)* (1.99)*
∆T t−2
∆T t−3
∆Tt−4
∆Gt−1 0.171 0.756 0.207
(2.99)** (6.37)*** (6.81)***
∆Gt−2
∆Gt−3
∆Gt−4
ECMTG -1.01
(-5.26)***
ECMTT
E -0.962 -0.927
(-13.58)*** (-17.89)***
ECMGG
E 0.098 -0.639
(2.42)* (-7.66)***
dEXP
(not incl.)
dCONTR
(not incl.)
adj. R2 0.57 - 0.78 0.69 0.82
Legend: k= var order; r= rank; CV= cointegration vector (T ;G; const);
*, **, *** denote, in the order, 5%, 1%, 0.1% significance level
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A.7 Summary Greece
Field Lab. - Treatments:
k=2; r=0; “T and G” “T only”
no CV n. of subjects: 8 n. of subjects: 15
Sample period 1977-98 1982-98 1982-98
Dependent ∆T t ∆Gt ∆T
E
t ∆G
E
t ∆T
E
t
const 0.566 0.525 0.458 0.529
(2.26)* (5.05)*** (5.05)*** (6.94)***
∆T Et−1 -0.186
(-3.64)***
∆T Et−2 -0.126
(-3.61)***
∆GEt−1
∆GEt−2
∆T t−1 0.389 0.238
(3.82)*** (2.46)*
∆T t−2
∆T t−3
∆Tt−4
∆Gt−1 0.400 0.109
(4.32)*** (3.84)***
∆Gt−2
∆Gt−3
∆Gt−4
ECMTG
ECMTT
E -0.861 -0.869
(-10.28)*** (-10.38)***
ECMGG
E -0.896
(-11.26)***
dEXP
’88-90
dCONTR
’96-97
adj. R2 - - 0.78 0.84 0.82
Legend: k= var order; r= rank; CV= cointegration vector (T ;G; const);
*, **, *** denote, in the order, 5%, 1%, 0.1% significance level
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A.8 Summary Ireland
Field Lab. - Treatments:
k=2; r=0; “T and G” “T only”
no CV n. of subjects: 17 n. of subjects: 22
Sample period 1972-97 1977-95 1977-95
Dependent ∆T t ∆Gt ∆T
E
t ∆G
E
t ∆T
E
t
const 0.601 0.404 0.311
(5.87)*** (3.48)** (5.94)***
∆T Et−1 -0.108 -0.098
(-2.01)* (-3.08)**
∆T Et−2
∆GEt−1
∆GEt−2
∆T t−1 0.553 0.344
(5.90)*** (5.76)***
∆T t−2
∆T t−3
∆Tt−4
∆Gt−1 0.080 0.234 0.159
(2.27)* (3.54)*** (9.28)***
∆Gt−2
∆Gt−3
∆Gt−4
ECMTG
ECMTT
E -0.662 -0.670
(-8.88)*** (-11.84)***
ECMGG
E -0.894
(-15.71)***
dEXP -0.743
’78-80 (-2.43)*
dCONTR
’83-84; ’88-87
adj. R2 - - 0.68 0.77 0.78
Legend: k= var order; r= rank; CV= cointegration vector (T ;G; const);
*, **, *** denote, in the order, 5%, 1%, 0.1% significance level
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A.9 Summary Italy
Field Lab. - Treatments:
k=4; r=1; “T and G” “T only”
CV=(1; -0.892; 0) n. of subjects: 14 n. of subjects: 17
Sample period 1974-98 1977-98 1977-98
Dependent ∆T t ∆Gt ∆T
E
t ∆G
E
t ∆T
E
t
const 0.158
(2.77)**
∆T Et−1 -0.203
(-3.34)**
∆T Et−2 -0.145
(-4.33)***
∆GEt−1 -0.151
(-2.69)**
∆GEt−2
∆T t−1 0.705 0.359
(9.58)*** (5.02)***
∆T t−2 0.279
(3.59)***
∆T t−3
∆Tt−4
∆Gt−1 -0.155 0.541 0.133
(-3.55)*** (6.47)*** (4.35)***
∆Gt−2 0.220
(3.04)**
∆Gt−3 0.587
(3.77)***
∆Gt−4
ECMTG -0.155 -0.111
(-3.53)*** (-5.67)***
ECMTT
E -0.629 -0.853
(-9.09)*** (-17.10)***
ECMGG
E 0.659
(-9.52)***
dEXP
(not incl.)
dCONTR
(not incl.)
adj. R2 0.09 0.33 0.83 0.71 0.84
Legend: k= var order; r= rank; CV= cointegration vector (T ;G; const);
*, **, *** denote, in the order, 5%, 1%, 0.1% significance level
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A.10 Summary Netherlands
Field Lab. - Treatments:
k=2; r=1; “T and G” “T only”
CV=(1; -0.606; -17.630) n. of subjects: 13 n. of subjects: 11
Sample period 1970-98 1977-98 1977-98
Dependent ∆T t ∆Gt ∆T
E
t ∆G
E
t ∆T
E
t
const 0.170 0.281
(2.73)** (5.23)*
∆T Et−1 -0.165 -0.112
(-4.11)*** (-3.35)***
∆T Et−2
∆GEt−1 0.122
(3.55)****
∆GEt−2
∆T t−1 0.402 0.301
(5.59)*** (3.23)**
∆T t−2
∆T t−3
∆Tt−4
∆Gt−1 0.368 0.478 0.534 0.175
(2.91)** (2.78)** (8.52)*** (4.05)**
∆Gt−2
∆Gt−3
∆Gt−4
ECMTG -0.622
(-2.27)*
ECMTT
E -0.516 -0.795
(-9.09)*** (-9.88)***
ECMGG
E -0.628
(-11.39)***
dEXP
(not incl.)
dCONTR
(not incl.)
adj. R2 0.32 0.22 0.77 0.77 0.88
Legend: k= var order; r= rank; CV= cointegration vector (T ;G; const);
*, **, *** denote, in the order, 5%, 1%, 0.1% significance level
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A.11 Summary Norway
Field Lab. - Treatments:
k=2; r=1; “T and G” “T only”
CV=(1; -1.051; 0) n. of subjects: 15 n. of subjects: 16
Sample period 1970-98 1977-98 1977-98
Dependent ∆T t ∆Gt ∆T
E
t ∆G
E
t ∆T
E
t
const 0.345
(3.87)***
∆T Et−1 -0.063 -0.190
(-2.01)* (-2.29)*
∆T Et−2 -0.218
(-3.32)*
∆GEt−1 -0.108
(-2.42)*
∆GEt−2
∆T t−1 -0.461 0.469 0.388
(-1.97)* (6.37)*** (6.43)***
∆T t−2
∆T t−3
∆Tt−4
∆Gt−1 0.489 0.605 0.164
(3.09)** (7.11)*** (7.49)***
∆Gt−2
∆Gt−3
∆Gt−4
ECMTG 0.308 0.093
(3.79)*** (2.44)*
ECMTT
E -0.669 0.156 -0.731
(-10.42)*** (1.99)* (-15.32)***
ECMGG
E -0.651
(-9.40)***
dEXP
’91-92
dCONTR
’94-96
adj. R2 - 0.40 0.81 0.77 0.81
Legend: k= var order; r= rank; CV= cointegration vector (T ;G; const);
*, **, *** denote, in the order, 5%, 1%, 0.1% significance level
42
A.12 Summary Portugal
Field Lab. - Treatments:
k=3; r=1; “T and G” “T only”
CV=(1; -1.177; 13.667)) n. of subjects: 10 n. of subjects: 13
Sample period 1970-98 1977-98 1977-98
Dependent ∆T t ∆Gt ∆T
E
t ∆G
E
t ∆T
E
t
const 0.833 0.176
(5.50)*** (2.24)***
∆T Et−1 -0.121 -0.173
(-2.20)* (3.05)
∆T Et−2
∆GEt−1 -0.266
(-3.87)***
∆GEt−2
∆T t−1 -0.591 0.354 0.407
(-2.62)* (2.93)** (4.25)***
∆T t−2 -0.436 -0.481 0.161
(-2.36)* (-2.67)* (2.23)*
∆T t−3
∆Tt−4
∆Gt−1 0.297 0.375 0.147 0.543 0.081
(4.14)*** (3.99)*** (5.49)*** (5.99)*** (6.53)***
∆Gt−2 0.168 0.374 0.059 0.159
(2.77)** (5.30)*** (2.08)* (2.07)*
∆Gt−3
∆Gt−4
ECMTG 0.288 0.666 0.321
(3.59)*** (6.58)*** (3.69)***
ECMTT
E -0.673 0.420 -0.758
(-8.24)*** (3.31)** (-9.05)***
ECMGG
E -0.497
(-6.23)***
dEXP
(not incl.)
dCONTR
(not incl.)
dum80 -12.294
(-12.62)***
adj. R2 0.25 0.94 0.64 0.60 0.81
Legend: k= var order; r= rank; CV= cointegration vector (T ;G; const);
*, **, *** denote, in the order, 5%, 1%, 0.1% significance level
43
A.13 Summary Spain
Field Lab. - Treatments:
k=2; r=0; “T and G” “T only”
no CV n. of subjects: 14 n. of subjects: 13
Sample period 1970-98 1977-98 1977-98
Dependent ∆T t ∆Gt ∆T
E
t ∆G
E
t ∆T
E
t
const 0.654 0.704 0.391 0.179
(3.80)*** (2.68)** (5.91)*** (2.82)**
∆T Et−1 -0.165
(-4.41)***
∆T Et−2 -0.072
(-2.28)*
∆GEt−1
∆GEt−2 -0.085
(-2.51)*
∆T t−1 0.524 0.687
(6.54)*** (7.40)***
∆T t−2
∆T t−3
∆Tt−4
∆Gt−1 0.113 0.772 0.186
(2.64)** (10.83)*** (5.15)***
∆Gt−2
∆Gt−3
∆Gt−4
ECMTG
ECMTT
E -0.904 -0.542
(-16.39)*** (-7.79)***
ECMGG
E 0.077 -0.624
(2.54)* (-11.39)***
dEXP
’81-82
dCONTR
’96-97
adj. R2 - - 0.83 0.74 0.83
Legend: k= var order; r= rank; CV= cointegration vector (T ;G; const);
*, **, *** denote, in the order, 5%, 1%, 0.1% significance level
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A.14 Summary Sweden
Field Lab. - Treatments:
k=2; r=0; “T and G” “T only”
CV=(1; -0.950; 0) n. of subjects: 17 n. of subjects: 14
Sample period 1970-98 1977-98 1977-98
Dependent ∆T t ∆Gt ∆T
E
t ∆G
E
t ∆T
E
t
const 0.223
(3.21)**
∆T Et−1 -0.074
(-2.48)*
∆T Et−2
∆GEt−1 -0.092
(-2.32)*
∆GEt−2
∆T t−1 -0.553 0.360 0.539
(-2.32)* (5.35)*** (7.35)***
∆T t−2
∆T t−3
∆Tt−4
∆Gt−1 0.423 0.590 0.134
(2.69)** (8.15)*** (5.30)***
∆Gt−2
∆Gt−3
∆Gt−4
ECMTG 0.276 0.080
(3.30)*** (3.87)***
ECMTT
E -0.786 -0.671
(-15.58)*** (-10.21)***
ECMGG
E -0.750
(-11.01)***
dEXP
’78-79; ’91-93
dCONTR 0.387
’83-84; ’86-87; ’94-96 (2.84)**
adj. R2 - 0.35 0.73 0.77 0.86
Legend: k= var order; r= rank; CV= cointegration vector (T ;G; const);
*, **, *** denote, in the order, 5%, 1%, 0.1% significance level
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A.15 Summary UK
Field Lab. - Treatments:
k=2; r=0; “T and G” “T only”
CV=(1; -0.922; 0) n. of subjects: 15 n. of subjects: 16
Sample period 1972-97 1977-95 1977-95
Dependent ∆T t ∆Gt ∆T
E
t ∆G
E
t ∆T
E
t
const 0.229 0.180
(4.80)*** (4.09)***
∆T Et−1 -0.117 -0.096
(-2.33)* (-2.37)*
∆T Et−2
∆GEt−1
∆GEt−2
∆T t−1 0.467 0.276 0.546
(6.91)*** (2.43)* (6.37)***
∆T t−2
∆T t−3
∆Tt−4
∆Gt−1 0.385 0.591 0.094
(2.33)* (8.37)* (2.96)**
∆Gt−2
∆Gt−3
∆Gt−4
ECMTG 0.435 -0.068 -0.070
(2.98)** (-2.14)* (-2.69)**
ECMTT
E -0.770 0.289 -0.785
(-13.97)*** (3.06)** (-10.36)***
ECMGG
E -0.726
(-12.28)***
dEXP -0.778
’92-93 (-3.12)**
dCONTR
(not incl.)
adj. R2 - 0.34 0.83 0.84 0.85
Legend: k= var order; r= rank; CV= cointegration vector (T ;G; const);
*, **, *** denote, in the order, 5%, 1%, 0.1% significance level
46
B Instructions to the experiment
1. Please read the instructions carefully. Only if you have understood them well you
can successfully participate in the experiment and gain money.
2. Thereafter fill in the questionnaire at the screen.
Welcome to the strategy experiment
Welcome to the strategy experiment
This strategy experiment is financed by the University of Mannheim and the German
research council.
The instructions are simple, and if you carefully pay attention to it and decide delib-
erately, you will win a considerable amount of money, which is disbursed to you at the
end of the game.
The payment is dependent on your success. In the experiment you forecast the de-
velopment of public expenditures and taxation in several European countries. For that
purpose there are past data about budget debt, annual change of budget debt, govern-
ment expenditure and taxes made available for you. Dependent on the quality of your
forecast you receive a payment for each period.
Please note that we do not have any interest in paying less money than you are
entitled to. We must return all the money, which we do not disburse to you, to the
German research council.
Please note that we will not deceive you in this experiment. Everything you read
in these instructions is correct. You may take this for granted, but actually there are
occasionally experiments in psychology, where experiment participants are deceived about
parts of the experiment. This is not the case in economic experiments like this. In the
beginning we explain exactly the rules to you, and we will also adhere to them.
Rules
You will play several rounds in turns. In each round it is your task to forecast the
development of two variables. These variables refer to the development of government
expenditure and taxes in several European states between 1950 and 2000. Which states
you play in each case will be specified randomly and is not made known to you. These
data are shown graphically.
Top of the screen
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On the left you can see the development of the budget debt and annual change of
budget debt, each in per cent of the gross national product. The horizontal axis shows time
in years. You may use this data to obtain a reference point how government expenditure
and taxes will change in the future. Current periods are shown in black, past periods are
shown in gray.
On the right you can see the government expenditure and taxes, again as percentage
share of the gross national product. The vertical axis shows government expenditure, the
horizontal axis shows taxes. Government expenditure is higher than taxes above the red
diagonal; below, government expenditure is lower than taxes. Past periods are shown in
a lighter shade of gray than current periods.
Partial representation of the past development You can present yourself also only
one part of the past periods to get a better overview.
In order to do so click on the diagrams budget debt and annual change of budget
debt. In these diagrams the range to the right of your click is covered black. Also in the
diagram of government expenditure and taxes the covered periods are not shown. Each
click onto the black range of the diagrams budget debt and annual change of budget debt
uncovers one period after another. A click on the blue range uncovers all periods.
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Forecasts In order to make a forecast about the development of government expenditure
and taxes, click onto the white range. Your forecast is shown in blue.
If you are content with your forecast, please confirm it by clicking on confirm forecast .
If you want to correct your forecast, please click on delete forecast .
Payment Given your forecast the computer determines a consumption decision, which
would be optimal for a person who lives in the period. From your consumption-decisions
you derive a certain utility. This utility is compared with the utility you would have
obtained if you had forecasted the true future development of taxes and government
expenditure.
You receive a wage of 0.45¤ per minute for a correct forecast. Worse forecasts result
in smaller wages.
It is worth to spend some time to make a good forecast. Example: You need 2 minutes
in order to make a very good forecast and therefore receive wages of 0.45¤ per minute.
Your income in the 2 minutes is thus 0.90¤.
Another person, who makes forecasts for e.g. 4 periods in these 2 minutes, which are
not so good, may only receive a wage of 0.10¤ per minute for each forecast. The income
of this person in the 2 minutes is thus only 0.20¤.
You should settle your forecast within 2 minutes. If you need more time for a forecast,
you are paid only for the first 2 minutes.
A warning on the left side will remind you, as soon as you need more than 2 minutes.
Furthermore you get a list about the income of your past forecasts on the left side.
Duration of the experiment The experiment takes 90 minutes, regardless whether
you made many or few forecasts in this time. That requires, however, that you take
yourself at least 20 seconds time for each forecast on the average. If you take yourself less
time, you are finished with the experiment sooner, but earn fewer money, accordingly.
Should you have any questions, you now have the opportunity to ask them. In addition,
you can ask questions at any time during the experiment.
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Appendix to the instructions
To determine your payoff we use the following model. It is not necessary to under-
stand this model to participate successfully in the experiment. The model is
shown only in case you want to control us.
In two subsequent periods you consume c0 and c1 and pay taxes t0, t1. You save the
remaining part:
si = 1− ci − ti (10)
Your total income in each period is Y = 1 (note that all values are relative to the gross
domestic product Y ).
We call government expenditure gi. Then your utility in two subsequent periods is
u =
1∑
i=0
γci + (1− γ)gi (11)
In your case γ = 0.75.
Your budget restriction is
1∑
i=0
si · (1 + r)
i = 0 (12)
with an interest rate r = 0.1.
Based on your forecast for t1 and g1 we determine your optimal consumption c0.
In the next period t1 und g1 are realised. Your actual consumption c1, and, hence, your
utility u, follows from the budget restriction. This utility is compared with the utility u∗
that you could have obtained with the correct forecast for t1 and g1. Your wage is (u/u
∗)η.
In your case η = 12000. This normalisation does not change your utility maximisation
problem.
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